

What Is That Patent Really Worth? Courts Take a Hard Look at the "Reasonable Royalty" Calculation




Jonathan D. Putnam
Competition Dynamics

Silicon Valley Advanced Patent Law Institute
December 6-7, 2012

Complex Products Embody Many Features



Features Earn Profits In Many Forms Not Just IP



Apportioning Profit Among Features

- “... the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention, as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”

-- *Georgia-Pacific* factor 13

Some notable jury awards

■ *Lucent*

- ▲ Accused sales: \$ 8 billion
- ▲ Plaintiff demand: \$562 million (7% of sales)
- ▲ Jury award: \$358 million (4.5% of sales)

■ *Uniloc*

- ▲ Accused sales: \$ 19 billion
 - ▲ Plaintiff demand: \$565 million (3% of sales)
 - ▲ Jury award: \$388 million (2% of sales)
-

Lucent and Uniloc on appeal

■ ***Lucent***

We find it inconceivable to conclude ... that the use of one small feature ... constitutes a substantial portion of the value of Outlook... the only reasonable conclusion is that most of the realizable profit must be credited to [other] elements, such as “the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by [Microsoft].”

■ ***Uniloc***

Evidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb [to determine profit shares] is thus inadmissible ... because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case

The Void Left By *Uniloc*

■ Generic fact pattern

- ▲ Complex device (smartphone, processor, ...) embodies 100s or 1000s of patents
- ▲ A “small” number of asserted patents
- ▲ But everything else is “large”
 - ◆ Accused sales
 - ◆ Current profits
 - ◆ Switching costs
 - ◆ → Plaintiff damages demand

■ With no 25 Percent Rule, is there any “rule” for determining one patent’s share of profit?

A Better “Rule” For Determining One Patent’s Share Of The Profit

- If you know
 - ▲ the size of the profit to be divided

 - and you can
 - ▲ count the number of relevant patents
 - ▲ rank the patents in order

 - then you can
 - ▲ divide the profit shares among the patents, so that
 - ▲ the sum of shares adds up to 100%
-

So Is This Just Another “Rule”?

- No
- The value depends on a patent's rank
 - ▲ Rankings are often fact-intensive and case-specific
 - ▲ Must identify all “peers” in the same product and compare to them – control for market conditions
- Assume that the “count” (number of patents) and “rank” steps have already been carried out
- Focus on the “divide” step – each patent's share

Steps To Obtaining Reliable Profit Shares

- Find the right distribution family
 - Find the right member of the family
 - Derive formula for shares from choice of member
 - Assess sensitivity of shares to the assumptions
 - Determine variability of shares in small portfolios
 - Etc. (what you pay an economist for ...)
-

Steps To Obtaining Reliable Profit Shares


- Find the right distribution family ✓
 - Find the right member of the family
 - Derive formula for shares from choice of member
 - Assess sensitivity of shares to the assumptions
 - Determine variability of shares in small portfolios
 - Etc. (what you pay an economist for ...)
-

Where Does Each Patent's Share Come From?

- For 25 years, economists have studied the distribution of patent values in large samples
 - ▲ Value distributions arise from patentee decisions
 - ◆ where to patent
 - ◆ when to patent / maintain the patent
 - ▲ Various methods, countries, technologies, models
 - Basic results
 - ▲ Values highly skewed (many low values, few highs)
 - ▲ Patent values vary greatly by country, tech field, etc.
 - ▲ Aggregate value of patent rights is 15 – 25% of R&D
-


Distributions 101 – The “Bell Curve”

Normal distribution:
positive and negative values, symmetric




Patent Values Do Not Fit The “Bell Curve”

Log-normal distribution:
positive values, skewed to the right



Expected shares do not vary as the pie varies



The Output

- Determine each patent's ratio to the average patent's share (0.1% in 1000-patent portfolio)
- Some exemplary ratios:


<u>Percentile</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Share of 1000-patent portfolio</u>
50 th	0.2	0.02%
75 th	0.9	0.09%
90 th	2.1	0.21%
95 th	3.7	0.37%

Example


- Suppose an accused product
 - ▲ generates \$5 billion in sales
 - ▲ yields \$1 billion in profit (20% margin – all patents)
 - ▲ embodies 1,000 patents
 - average profit per patent is \$1 million
 - then the expected values are approximately

<u>Percentile</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>Value</u>
50 th	0.02%	\$ 200,000
95 th	0.37%	\$3,700,000

Lorenz graph – patents ordered low to high



Lorenz graph – patents ordered low to high



Revisiting Lucent's \$562 million demand

■ Suppose

- ▲ Lucent's patent ranked in the 95th percentile among Microsoft patents
- ▲ Therefore, the patent is expected to be worth 3.7 times the value of the average Microsoft patent
- ▲ Therefore, the average Microsoft patent must be:

$$\begin{aligned} & \$562 \text{ million} \\ & \div \underline{3.7} \text{ multiplier for a 95}^{\text{th}} \text{ percentile patent} \\ & = \$152 \text{ million average MSFT patent value} \end{aligned}$$

Revisiting Lucent's \$562 million demand

■ Suppose

- ▲ 95th percentile rank among MSFT patents
- ▲ → 3.7 times the value of the average MSFT patent
- ▲ → average MSFT patent worth $\$562\text{M} \div 3.7 = \152M
- ▲ → 18,000 MSFT U.S. patents @ \$152M = \$2.7 trillion
- ▲ MSFT market capitalization: \$270 billion
- ▲ Recent transactions
 - ◆ MSFT – AOL: \$1.1M per patent
 - ◆ Facebook – MSFT: \$0.9M per patent
 - ◆ Others (Novell, Nortel, Motorola, ...): \$0.5 - \$2.0M per patent

Revisiting Lucent's \$562 million demand

■ What is a better guess for the value of the patent?

■ Suppose

$$\begin{aligned} &\triangle \quad \$8.0 \quad \text{billion accused sales} \\ &\quad \times \quad 40\% \quad \text{profit margin} \\ &= \quad \$3.2 \quad \text{billion profit (too high – all patents)} \\ &\quad \div \quad 500 \quad \text{Outlook patents} \\ &= \quad \$6.4 \quad \text{million profit per patent (too high – \$2M?)} \\ &\quad \times \quad 3.7 \quad \text{multiplier for a 95}^{\text{th}} \text{ percentile patent} \\ &= \quad \$23.7 \quad \text{million*} \end{aligned}$$

* JMOL: \$26.3 million

Oracle v. Google

- Frame the damages claim first – before trial

“What share of the hypothetical license would have been accounted for by an Oracle patent?”

- “Therefore, Dr. Cockburn can opine that the 569 patents that would have been included in the 2006 license bundle had a value-distribution curve similar to that observed in the three cited studies three of the patents in suit, [and] were among the 22 most valuable patents in the bundle (top 4%), but cannot opine that those three patents were the most valuable of the 569 patents (top 0.5%)”

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART GOOGLE’S *DAUBERT* MOTION
TO EXCLUDE DR. COCKBURN’S THIRD REPORT

<http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-785.pdf>


Oracle v. Google

- Frame the damages claim first – before trial:


“What share of the hypothetical license is attributable to an Oracle patent?”

■ Total Oracle patents	569	Count
Asserted patents' place	Top 22	Rank
What is their share?		
Oracle	77%	} Divide
Google	?	
Court expert	53%	

Confidence intervals in finite samples



Ruling Out Inconsistent Claims



How Has “Count, Rank & Divide” Fared In Court?

- “... the Court finds [the] methodology to be credible and consistent with Federal Circuit case law and the *Georgia Pacific* factors

“With AUO’s aggregate claim against LGD assessed, Dr. Putnam then used a method described as “count, rank, and divide” to determine the portion of the claim attributable to the four asserted patents. This method takes into account *Georgia Pacific* factors 9-11.

“Based on the value share of each patent in AUO’s portfolio and based on the assumption that these patents are in the top 5% of AUO’s portfolio, Dr. Putnam determined that AUO’s damages for infringement of all four patents would total \$305,399 ...”

-- *LG Display v. AU Optronics et al.*, Civ. Ac. No. 06-726 (D.Del. 2009) (Farnan, J.)

How Has “Count, Rank & Divide” Fared In Court?

- **Admitted at trial (over *Daubert* challenge)**

Energy Transportation Group v. Sonic Innovations et al. (D. Del. 2008) (Sleet, J.)

- **Cited by Oracle in support of expert testimony**

ORACLE AMERICA, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO GOOGLE’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THIRD EXPERT REPORT BY IAIN COCKBURN AND EXPERT REPORT BY STEVEN SHUGAN, Feb. 24, 2012 (Dkt. No. 737)

FAQs

- Does this method work for every product?
 - What is the right definition of “profit”?
 - How do you determine the number of “relevant patents”? And what if you’re wrong?
 - How do you rank patents? What if you’re wrong?
 - What about non-patent sources of profit (like copyrights or trade secrets or ...)?
-

More FAQs

- Does your method assume that the asserted patent is valid and infringed?
 - Your method is based on patents from a different firm / country / technology / time period – does it still apply to my case?
 - Is this the only way to apportion profits?
 - How much “wiggle room” is there in your calculations?
-

Contact

■ **Jonathan Putnam**
Competition Dynamics
125 Washington St., Suite 202
Salem, MA 01970
Jon.Putnam@CompetitionDynamics.com
(617) 794-9841

* The foregoing presentation is an incomplete description of one method of apportioning profits. It does not and cannot substitute for a complete economic analysis of patent damages, which must be tied to the facts of a particular case.